Ostensibly, our cave-in to the Russians is our unilateral move to gain their support against Iran to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Yeah, that will happen. We give in now and hope they'll do something they've refused to do for years. In fact they refused just last week. And now that we've moved to grant their wish, what incentive would they have to change their minds. Or, if they accept some sort of sanctions, does anyone really believe that they will stop working with Iran behind the scenes?
Of course, what would you expect from an administration that bowed to Chinese pressure and refused to meet with the Dalai Lama? Obama was willing to annoy China by starting up a trade war on the import of Chinese tires in order to throw something to his Union supporters, but he's not willing to meet with a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.
UPDATE: Rich Lowry links to this story that explains how this was simply a unilateral decision taken by Obama with no guarantee of any reciprocal action from Russia.
Russia hinted that Obama's decision would not be met by any swift or generous concessions. The country's foreign ministry spokesman, Andrei Nesterenko, described the move as "obviously a positive sign for us" but made clear the decision had been a unilateral one taken by Washington alone. He suggested there had been no deals with Moscow on Iran or other issues. "That would disagree with our policy of resolution of any problems in relations with any countries, no matter how difficult or sensitive they may be."And the timing of the announcement has historic resonance.
But it made for unfortunate timing, as Thursday is the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland at the start of World War II, a date fraught with sensitivity for Poles who viewed the Bush missile defense system as a political security blanket against Russia. Poland and many other countries in the former Soviet sphere worry that Mr. Obama is less willing to stand up to Russia.(Link via Tom Maguire)
10 comments:
At Pajama Media,Arthur Chrenkoff noted that 70 years ago the west stood by as the Red Army crossed the Polish border then occupied and annexed large parts of what are now Eastern Poland, Western Ukraine, Belarus ans Southern Lithuania. Link is at http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/still-dis-putin'-history-after-all-these-years/
The actions and inactions then contributed to the carnage of WW2 and yet,today, our government chooses to deny defensive capability to allies as the threat becomes more immediate?
HChambers,
Chrenkoff is back in action? I didn't know that. Great news. Thanks very much.
For the sake of appeasing Russian pride on the subject of influence in Eastern Europe, and that is all this is since the missile defense system would have posed no strategic threat to the Kremlin's ability to wage nuclear war, the Obama administration has signaled to the world that it is not willing to continue to provide security for it's allies.
Possibly worse, Iran's continued development of nuclear weapons technology does not have a counter other than a preemptive or retaliatory strike. Depending on the final composition and disposition of Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the current systems alluded to in the WaPo article as a "shorter-range, sea-based system", could be wholly ineffective. Those systems are viable, to a degree, against North Korean missiles because of unique geographical advantages not present in the Iranian scenario.
I don't apply this next comment to Poland as much as I would for Japan and Taiwan, but countries that have benefited from the U.S. defensive umbrella in the past should probably consider embarking on independent nuclear programs of their in the face of an American retreat under Russian pressure. If America won't stand by allies in Europe, what will it do for Taiwan, Japan, or others? Some may well explore an independent nuclear program and can be added to the growing list of nuclear capable countries while we degrade our ability to defend against such a threat.
This is a move reminiscent of Jimmy Carter's give-away of the Panama Canal. It is a gesture intended to foment goodwill but will not while something of great value will have been given away for nothing in return. Russia and others will continue to trade or sell technology to belligerent countries and we will be left with fewer options at our disposal to mitigate threats in an increasingly dangerous world.
Having a missile defense capability would give the President a valuable tool to deter Iranian threats against the United States and Europe. Without that capability the opportunity to drive a wedge between America and Europe through the intimidation of nuclear tipped ballistic missiles has never been greater. This move will ultimately weaken political unity across the Atlantic.
We've seen in the past that when the United States retreats from its role as a counterweight to aggression it will not be long before we see the waters tested again. Back down from the Russians, back down from the Iranians, and it won't be long before they seek to push the margins again. How long before Huge Chavez becomes emboldened enough to make that final reckless miscalculation?
This was an ill advised move on the part of the Obama administration. If it was never his intent to deploy the system, he could have certainly stalled for the time needed to provide a replacement or could have sought to use the cancellation to earn bigger concessions from Russia. In true Jimmy Carter style, Obama has cast the country in retreat and will certainly tempt those that seek to test our limits.
To take some of the sting out of this at least as far as the US is concerned are confirmed reports that the US and Turkey are already negotiating to put the same systems in Turkey. Also that the Poles and Czechs have been promised upgraded Patriot(Pac 3) systems to be deployed there. Also that the superior Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 from Israel and the US might be sold to the Czechs and deployed by the US in the Mediterranean.
http://tinyurl.com/mj5bvn
This may actual be a strategic and tactical improvement, defintely tactical for the Poles and the Czechs and a nightmare for the Russians, but the strategic implications can have exactly the opposite effect on the public. By keeping the left in the US happy Obama has appeared weak in the world and while actually creating a new and unexpected problem for the the Russians by exchanging a strategic system for a tactical one on the borders of Russia.
It also should be noted that both the Patriot and Arrow are solid-fueled which gives the opposition much less time to locate, respond and suppress.
Pat Patterson,
I'm not satisfied with the trade-off. Those other systems mentioned and the possible deployment of systems in Turkey should be complimentary to the interceptors originally planned for Poland, not an alternative.
Systems like Patriot are fine for point defense and Arrow might be a little better than that but by the time these systems are able to be applied to the problem, the missile and warhead are already at a stage that makes them most difficult to hit and well over friendly territory. The key to successful interception is a multi-layered defense with integrated radar systems that can bring a variety of interceptors against the target from the boost phase onward.
I'm not convinced Poland was the best place to locate interceptors when it comes to achieving a kill on missiles launched against Europe from Iran but I have no confidence that Turkey can be trusted in this regard. Turkey is fraught with it's own problems and is vulnerable to Russian pressure levied directly against it in the form of energy issues and indirectly as a meddling player in regional issues.
The solid fuel nature of Patriot and Arrow are a wash as I am not aware of any liquid fueled interceptors, or ICBMs for that matter, still in our inventory.
I feel bad for Polish and Czech leaders that have taken a risk to help us defend our own country along with theirs. This decision will cast doubt on all future security relations with the United States where Russia may oppose. This will not end well for American foreign policy in Europe.
I agree for the most part but I'm somewhat reassured that there are mitagations in changing the deployment. I especially liked the part of announcing using AEGIS equipped destroyers in the Med and by extension the Black Sea as a well-aimed reminder to the Russians that they don't have much of a presence in either nor do the Iranians have much capability to attack in either spheres. And that the Arrow is compatible with systems, radar etc., currently in the US inventory. The reference to solid-fueled is simply that the time to launch and detection by the opposition makes air-to-ground defenses virtually useless.
I am mainly concerned that Obama has actually increased the risk level while ostensibly trying to appease the Russians. As far as ideal interception points I also agree but it should be noted that the Arrow as also fully capable of being launched by air as a recent test against a Shahab-3 comparable ICBM by an IAF F-15.
Now that I've had a chance to read that the Polish prime minister refused to take calls from Hillary Clinton on this matter and that these calls were made at the last minute, I'm beginning to consider that the timing of this move was not about foreign policy.
The State Department could have better prepared the Polish government for this development and the President should have spoken directly to his counterpart in Warsaw days before the public announcement. That did not happen because the Obama Administration had probably not planned to announce this decision on 17 September, the 70th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.
There is plenty of doubt that the timing was driven by concern for national security, so that leaves internal political concerns as a driving force. In an effort to drown out the growing ACORN crescendo and the funeral dirge playing for his health insurance/care "plan", Obama has picked possibly the worst day in Polish history to remind that country of how they are so easily abandoned in alliances with leaders with a proclivity for appeasement.
But this isn't really a story about knocking down missiles, it's about intercepting and diverting media attention because there's bad press and there's BAD press.
The Shahab-3 is a MRBM and demonstrates a less challenging flight profile than an ICBM capable of striking the United States, though it is still very dangerous and very difficult to intercept.
I know about the Arrow and I know about Green Pine but I'm not ready to trust the defense of the United States to a system we do not exercise complete operational control over.
We can agree, without question, on this point:
"...Obama has actually increased the risk level while ostensibly trying to appease the Russians."
That is absolutely true.
Positioning ships and maintaining them on station indefinitely is problematic. Weather impacts ships much more dramatically than ground launched systems. If Turkey is pressured into denying access to the Black Sea to our ships, what then? The Eastern Mediterranean may be an effective location to provide some support for Israel but what about the other countries, including the United States. Those interceptors on the Aegis class ships are great when they're in the flight path, particularly at the earliest stages of a launch. That doesn't make the Mediterranean a good choice.
I'm all for an airborne element in this picture but that will take good indications and warning from intelligence and that is just not something we can depend on comfortably. Ask yourself how long an F-15 can remain on station carrying a missile intended to engage ballistic missiles. The issues impacting ships waiting on station can also be applied to a larger aircraft modified for the task. I'm not against these ideas but I'm not convinced that they alone are the answer. I'm not suggesting that you are either but I'm am convinced that political expedience at the national leadership level has clouded judgment on the decision to remove those ground based interceptors from the plan. Obama should consider deploying them elsewhere to compliment these other systems.
The idea that Pres Obama has mentioned AEGIS equipped ships is also problematic as we only have 22 in the current inventory. That would mean, I'm guessing without looking it up, that only 10 could be at sea at any time? To cover three main theaters at any time?
And as I noted earlier Turkey and the US seem to be on the verge of announcing the placement of the system in Turkey. Which when you think about is odd because supposedly the system is not reliable enough for Europe but is reliable enough to deploy in Turkey?
http://tinyurl.com/mj5bvn
It's a bungle and ultimately could put American interests and citizens in greater risk then the "realism" of Nixon's White Paper ever did.
Pat Patterson,
That was a good article. The last paragraph is particularly applicable. We simply cannot exert enough influence in Turkey to be certain that we can count on them for our defense, to say nothing of political, cultural, and religious issues simmering there.
Aegis is a very expensive system that involves more than 600 different contracting entities by itself. Ships are maintenance intensive and require more personnel to operate than land systems. The rotation of crews for training and rest is another factor to be considered. At the very least, the USN will need to increase the size of it's current fleet of Aegis equipped vessels and add the corresponding personnel to compliment them. The process will take a great deal of money and a long, long time.
Like Obama's flawed assessments of the efficacy and savings of his health care boondoggle, the Obama-shield or Obambrella© missile defense will cost more than promised and leave dangerous gaps in coverage. Yes, there is certainly an analogy present in this latest gaff from the White House. Obama's claim that Aegis will be a cheaper, "lighter", more "flexible" alternative needs more scrutiny and is likely to not be any of those things. My personal experience with military systems, equipment, and programs touted as "lighter and more flexible" usually means that something else is sacrificed that you'll wish you had when the going gets ugly. And nothing in the military gets cheaper with time.
The financial cost of relying on a single system like Aegis will be staggering but the costs should that single system fail, could be incalculable.
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