Charles Krauthammer has some optimistic thoughts about how Israel can actually achieve the goalof ending Hamas rule in Gaza without having to occupy Gaza. The first step is not to give into the demands for a UN-patrolled cease fire that will just be an excuse for Hamas to rearm and reestablish its control over the territory while Israel is prevented from resuming action. Krauthammer believes that Hamas is already losing control over Gaza.
This is not about killing every last Hamas gunman. Not possible, not necessary. Regimes rule not by physically overpowering every person in their domain, but by getting the majority to accept their authority. That is what sustains Hamas, and that is what is now under massive assault.
Hamas' leadership is not only seriously degraded but openly humiliated. The great warriors urging others to martyrdom are cowering underground almost entirely incommunicado. Demonstrably unable to protect their own people, they beg for outside help, receiving in return nothing but words from their Arab and Iranian brothers. And who in fact is providing the corridors for humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians? Israel.
In the first four minutes of this war, the Israel Air Force destroyed 50 targets, taking down practically every instrument and symbol of Hamas rule. Gaza's Potemkin leaders were marginalized and rendered helpless, leaving their people to fend for themselves. At such moments, regimes are extremely vulnerable to forfeiting what the Chinese call the mandate of heaven, the sense of legitimacy that undergirds all forms of governance.
Gazans might come to decide that they prefer the corruption of Fatah over the death and destruction that Hamas rule has meant.
Of course, this wouldn't mean peace and stability in Gaza. Fatah would come in. And, as Clifford May reminds us, Hamas has also been waging war against Fatah.
Three years ago, Hamas won a surprise victory over Fatah in legislative elections. But for Hamas leaders, this initiation into the democratic experience was not life-changing. So, in June 2007, they launched a military coup against Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.
Within four days, “Hamas gunmen clad in black ski masks controlled the dusty streets,” writes Jonathan Schanzer in his new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. “It would not be long before the fall of the [Palestinian Authority’s] fortress-like security compound, al-Suraya. Indeed, Hamas fighters had burrowed a tunnel beneath the building, detonated deadly explosives, and breached it.” Hamas fighters also threw several of their Fatah opponents off the roofs of high-rise buildings. In European and Arab capitals, demonstrations did not break out.
As Schanzer explains, the violence “was a clear and outward manifestation of a civil war” that began in 1987. As recent events reveal, it isn’t over yet. Hamas doubtless understands that Israel’s military mission in Gaza could end with the restoration of Fatah’s position in Gaza. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how Fatah could do this absent Israeli intervention. Fatah is not strong enough to challenge Hamas through force of arms. Nor can Fatah regain power at the ballot box: Hamas would win or, were that in question, Hamas would not permit a fair vote.
Of course, the outcome of the current battle between Hamas and Israel remains uncertain. Hamas continues to launch missiles at Israeli villages — even as its spokesmen and supporters decry a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In other words, Hamas believes that by simultaneously displaying defiance and exploiting Palestinian suffering it can score a victory in the media and in international forums — which is at least as valuable as winning on the ground.
I wonder how much of Israeli intelligence that allowed it to launch its shock and awe beginning to this war actually came from Fatah sources who are hoping to see Israel kill off Hamas for them. Fatah is no picnic, but sometimes your choices are both bad and it is the least awful choice that Israel can hope for.
Charles Krauthammer has some optimistic thoughts about how Israel can actually achieve the goalof ending Hamas rule in Gaza without having to occupy Gaza. The first step is not to give into the demands for a UN-patrolled cease fire that will just be an excuse for Hamas to rearm and reestablish its control over the territory while Israel is prevented from resuming action. Krauthammer believes that Hamas is already losing control over Gaza.
This is not about killing every last Hamas gunman. Not possible, not necessary. Regimes rule not by physically overpowering every person in their domain, but by getting the majority to accept their authority. That is what sustains Hamas, and that is what is now under massive assault.
Hamas' leadership is not only seriously degraded but openly humiliated. The great warriors urging others to martyrdom are cowering underground almost entirely incommunicado. Demonstrably unable to protect their own people, they beg for outside help, receiving in return nothing but words from their Arab and Iranian brothers. And who in fact is providing the corridors for humanitarian assistance to Palestinian civilians? Israel.
In the first four minutes of this war, the Israel Air Force destroyed 50 targets, taking down practically every instrument and symbol of Hamas rule. Gaza's Potemkin leaders were marginalized and rendered helpless, leaving their people to fend for themselves. At such moments, regimes are extremely vulnerable to forfeiting what the Chinese call the mandate of heaven, the sense of legitimacy that undergirds all forms of governance.
Gazans might come to decide that they prefer the corruption of Fatah over the death and destruction that Hamas rule has meant.
Of course, this wouldn't mean peace and stability in Gaza. Fatah would come in. And, as Clifford May reminds us, Hamas has also been waging war against Fatah.
Three years ago, Hamas won a surprise victory over Fatah in legislative elections. But for Hamas leaders, this initiation into the democratic experience was not life-changing. So, in June 2007, they launched a military coup against Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.
Within four days, “Hamas gunmen clad in black ski masks controlled the dusty streets,” writes Jonathan Schanzer in his new book, Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine. “It would not be long before the fall of the [Palestinian Authority’s] fortress-like security compound, al-Suraya. Indeed, Hamas fighters had burrowed a tunnel beneath the building, detonated deadly explosives, and breached it.” Hamas fighters also threw several of their Fatah opponents off the roofs of high-rise buildings. In European and Arab capitals, demonstrations did not break out.
As Schanzer explains, the violence “was a clear and outward manifestation of a civil war” that began in 1987. As recent events reveal, it isn’t over yet. Hamas doubtless understands that Israel’s military mission in Gaza could end with the restoration of Fatah’s position in Gaza. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how Fatah could do this absent Israeli intervention. Fatah is not strong enough to challenge Hamas through force of arms. Nor can Fatah regain power at the ballot box: Hamas would win or, were that in question, Hamas would not permit a fair vote.
Of course, the outcome of the current battle between Hamas and Israel remains uncertain. Hamas continues to launch missiles at Israeli villages — even as its spokesmen and supporters decry a growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In other words, Hamas believes that by simultaneously displaying defiance and exploiting Palestinian suffering it can score a victory in the media and in international forums — which is at least as valuable as winning on the ground.
I wonder how much of Israeli intelligence that allowed it to launch its shock and awe beginning to this war actually came from Fatah sources who are hoping to see Israel kill off Hamas for them. Fatah is no picnic, but sometimes your choices are both bad and it is the least awful choice that Israel can hope for.
Given prior experience with UN "Observers" and "Peacekeepers", anyone (not just Israel) who is being negotiated with to allow such as a "solution" should have the following non-negotiable proviso: If the UN forces fail to prevent re-arming and a later renewal of hostilities, then they are co-belligerents, and will be treated as such when the balloon goes up.
I.e., when the next round of fighting starts, the UN forces are targets just like the forces they were supposed to ride heard on, and didn't.
This will either force the UN to get serious about peacekeeping, or else stop pretending it can keep the peace.
The IDF released footage of secondary explosions from a mosque hit by a satellite- or laser-guided bomb. Obviously, weapons had been stored inside that mosque. The Israelis are known for their excellent intelligence, but incidents like that bombing suggest they are getting inside info from someone. They never would have risked the pummeling they'd have taken (from bleeding hearts) by bombing that mosque had they been less than absolutely certain what was inside, and it's highly doubtful any Isreali was ever in there..