Time Magazine looks at the five biggest mistakes that Hillary Clinton made. Two mistakes really stand out: her team didn't understand the importance of the proportional rules for allocating delegates to the Democratic convention plus they never really organized in the caucus states.
Clinton picked people for her team primarily for their loyalty to her, instead of their mastery of the game. That became abundantly clear in a strategy session last year, according to two people who were there. As aides looked over the campaign calendar, chief strategist Mark Penn confidently predicted that an early win in California would put her over the top because she would pick up all the state's 370 delegates. It sounded smart, but as every high school civics student now knows, Penn was wrong: Democrats, unlike the Republicans, apportion their delegates according to vote totals, rather than allowing any state to award them winner-take-all. Sitting nearby, veteran Democratic insider Harold M. Ickes, who had helped write those rules, was horrified — and let Penn know it. "How can it possibly be," Ickes asked, "that the much vaunted chief strategist doesn't understand proportional allocation?" And yet the strategy remained the same, with the campaign making its bet on big-state victories. Even now, it can seem as if they don't get it. Both Bill and Hillary have noted plaintively that if Democrats had the same winner-take-all rules as Republicans, she'd be the nominee. Meanwhile, the Clinton campaign now acknowledges privately:
3. She underestimated the caucus states While Clinton based her strategy on the big contests, she seemed to virtually overlook states like Minnesota, Nebraska and Kansas, which choose their delegates through caucuses. She had a reason: the Clintons decided, says an adviser, that "caucus states were not really their thing." Her core supporters — women, the elderly, those with blue-collar jobs — were less likely to be able to commit an evening of the week, as the process requires. But it was a little like unilateral disarmament in states worth 12% of the pledged delegates. Indeed, it was in the caucus states that Obama piled up his lead among pledged delegates. "For all the talent and the money they had over there," says Axelrod, "they — bewilderingly — seemed to have little understanding for the caucuses and how important they would become."
By the time Clinton's lieutenants realized the grave nature of their error, they lacked the resources to do anything about it
It seems clear that the Clintons were running a campaign based on their past victories and hadn't adjusted to the new reality. That lack of flexibility and ability to adapt in politics is deadly. Whatever you might think of Obama, his campaign team certainly figured out a way to play to all his advantages and milk the rules of the Democratic Party's convoluted process. It's silly for the Clintons to start whining now because they have finally figured out that the Democratic Party has different rules than the Republican Party. As soon as Obama announced that he was getting into the race last year, I thought he'd be a formidable opponent for Hillary. I also fear that he'll be an equally formidable one for John McCain.
I worry that the Republicans will also try to play by yesterday's rules instead of adapting to 2008. We're behind in having a 527 and 501(c) presence. The Obama campaign is going to be rolling in money and there seems to be no end to his ability to raise funds. Then add on top of that the ability of independent liberal groups to raise and spend money and the Republicans are going to seem like poor cousins. Charles Krauthammer focuses more on the ideological and attitudinal errors that Clinton made as she bounced from being the centrist candidate to trying to move to the left and fight on Obama's turf. She was never able to gain traction there. She finally found her attitudinal advantage and then squandered it with the silly push for a gas tax holiday.
Clinton finally understood the way to run against Obama: back to the center -- not ideologically but culturally, not on policy but on attitude. She changed none of her positions on Iraq or Iran or health care or taxes. Instead, she transformed herself into working-class Sally-get-her-gun, off duck hunting with dad.
The gas tax holiday was never an economic or policy issue. It was meant to position her culturally. It heightened her identification with her white working-class constituency. Obama played his part by citing economists in opposing it. That completed her narrative: He had the pointy-headed professors on his side; she had the single moms seeking relief at the pump.
It was an overreach. It not only deflected attention away from the amazing Rev. Wright at the height of his spectacular return. It also never played as the elitist-vs.-working-folk issue she had wanted, because it isn't just economists who know the gas tax holiday is nothing but a cheap gimmick. Ordinary folks do, too. And the gas tax idea had the unfortunate side effect of reinforcing Hillary's main character liability vis-a-vis Obama: cynical Washington pol willing to do or say anything to win votes vs. the idealistic straight shooter refusing to pander even if it costs him.
Between the tactical and the strategic mistakes she has certainly lost any claim to being such a smart politician. Republicans were asking 18 months ago if she could be stopped. The answer is yes, she can.
Now the question is whether or not McCain can capitalize on the path that Clinton seemed to paving for him in the past few weeks of how to portray Obama attitudinally out of touch with most Americans. I think that conservatives are fooling themselves in seeing him as some pushover candidate whose bubble will burst in the general campaign.
Time Magazine looks at the five biggest mistakes that Hillary Clinton made. Two mistakes really stand out: her team didn't understand the importance of the proportional rules for allocating delegates to the Democratic convention plus they never really organized in the caucus states.
Clinton picked people for her team primarily for their loyalty to her, instead of their mastery of the game. That became abundantly clear in a strategy session last year, according to two people who were there. As aides looked over the campaign calendar, chief strategist Mark Penn confidently predicted that an early win in California would put her over the top because she would pick up all the state's 370 delegates. It sounded smart, but as every high school civics student now knows, Penn was wrong: Democrats, unlike the Republicans, apportion their delegates according to vote totals, rather than allowing any state to award them winner-take-all. Sitting nearby, veteran Democratic insider Harold M. Ickes, who had helped write those rules, was horrified — and let Penn know it. "How can it possibly be," Ickes asked, "that the much vaunted chief strategist doesn't understand proportional allocation?" And yet the strategy remained the same, with the campaign making its bet on big-state victories. Even now, it can seem as if they don't get it. Both Bill and Hillary have noted plaintively that if Democrats had the same winner-take-all rules as Republicans, she'd be the nominee. Meanwhile, the Clinton campaign now acknowledges privately:
3. She underestimated the caucus states While Clinton based her strategy on the big contests, she seemed to virtually overlook states like Minnesota, Nebraska and Kansas, which choose their delegates through caucuses. She had a reason: the Clintons decided, says an adviser, that "caucus states were not really their thing." Her core supporters — women, the elderly, those with blue-collar jobs — were less likely to be able to commit an evening of the week, as the process requires. But it was a little like unilateral disarmament in states worth 12% of the pledged delegates. Indeed, it was in the caucus states that Obama piled up his lead among pledged delegates. "For all the talent and the money they had over there," says Axelrod, "they — bewilderingly — seemed to have little understanding for the caucuses and how important they would become."
By the time Clinton's lieutenants realized the grave nature of their error, they lacked the resources to do anything about it
It seems clear that the Clintons were running a campaign based on their past victories and hadn't adjusted to the new reality. That lack of flexibility and ability to adapt in politics is deadly. Whatever you might think of Obama, his campaign team certainly figured out a way to play to all his advantages and milk the rules of the Democratic Party's convoluted process. It's silly for the Clintons to start whining now because they have finally figured out that the Democratic Party has different rules than the Republican Party. As soon as Obama announced that he was getting into the race last year, I thought he'd be a formidable opponent for Hillary. I also fear that he'll be an equally formidable one for John McCain.
I worry that the Republicans will also try to play by yesterday's rules instead of adapting to 2008. We're behind in having a 527 and 501(c) presence. The Obama campaign is going to be rolling in money and there seems to be no end to his ability to raise funds. Then add on top of that the ability of independent liberal groups to raise and spend money and the Republicans are going to seem like poor cousins. Charles Krauthammer focuses more on the ideological and attitudinal errors that Clinton made as she bounced from being the centrist candidate to trying to move to the left and fight on Obama's turf. She was never able to gain traction there. She finally found her attitudinal advantage and then squandered it with the silly push for a gas tax holiday.
Clinton finally understood the way to run against Obama: back to the center -- not ideologically but culturally, not on policy but on attitude. She changed none of her positions on Iraq or Iran or health care or taxes. Instead, she transformed herself into working-class Sally-get-her-gun, off duck hunting with dad.
The gas tax holiday was never an economic or policy issue. It was meant to position her culturally. It heightened her identification with her white working-class constituency. Obama played his part by citing economists in opposing it. That completed her narrative: He had the pointy-headed professors on his side; she had the single moms seeking relief at the pump.
It was an overreach. It not only deflected attention away from the amazing Rev. Wright at the height of his spectacular return. It also never played as the elitist-vs.-working-folk issue she had wanted, because it isn't just economists who know the gas tax holiday is nothing but a cheap gimmick. Ordinary folks do, too. And the gas tax idea had the unfortunate side effect of reinforcing Hillary's main character liability vis-a-vis Obama: cynical Washington pol willing to do or say anything to win votes vs. the idealistic straight shooter refusing to pander even if it costs him.
Between the tactical and the strategic mistakes she has certainly lost any claim to being such a smart politician. Republicans were asking 18 months ago if she could be stopped. The answer is yes, she can.
Now the question is whether or not McCain can capitalize on the path that Clinton seemed to paving for him in the past few weeks of how to portray Obama attitudinally out of touch with most Americans. I think that conservatives are fooling themselves in seeing him as some pushover candidate whose bubble will burst in the general campaign.