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Thursday, December 07, 2006

How an advisory commision should have been conducted

Eliot Cohen, who wrote a superb book on civilian leadership in wartime, Supreme Command, puts his finger on exactly what was wrong with the Iraq Study Group.
The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war -- a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides.

They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar.

They -- not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries -- would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over.
Instead we get this mess of pottage from the ISG. Perhaps that is the result when the direction from the group comes from the legislative rather than the executive branch. As I argued in my column last week, the history of attempts by Congress to take a leadership role in directing warfare in our country is not encouraging.
In December of 1776, at the low-point of the Revolution, during the “times that try men’s souls,” the Continental Congress voted to deny itself war-making powers and gave those powers to Gen. Washington. At the Constitutional Convention, there was little debate about giving the powers of commander-in-chief to the president.

The Founders followed the advice of Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who, as historian David Hackett Fischer quotes, had argued that “The Fate of War is so uncertain, dependent on so many Contingencies. A Day, nay an Hour is so important in the Crisis of publick Affairs that it would be folly to wait for Relief from the deliberative Councils of Legislative Bodies.” Although Congress retained oversight and the power of the budget, the Founders recognized that Congressional committees were not the optimal directors of military policy.
But now we have this congressional-sponsored commission coming up with its own results developed without suitable research on the ground and without much military expertise. As Cohen says,
A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability" -- a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty."

No kidding -- but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge.

Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences?

War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action.
The commissions seems to have just decided how they would like Iran and Syria to behave in their fantasy world: not aid the insurgents in Iraq, stay out of Lebanon, not develop Iranian nuclear weapons, not attack Israel, the whole shebang of dream-world wishes about how some alternate universe Iranians and Syrians might want to behave. This is no way to win a war

posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 6:59 AM 0 comments

Comments:

Eliot Cohen, who wrote a superb book on civilian leadership in wartime, Supreme Command, puts his finger on exactly what was wrong with the Iraq Study Group.

The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war -- a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides.

They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar.

They -- not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries -- would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over.

Instead we get this mess of pottage from the ISG. Perhaps that is the result when the direction from the group comes from the legislative rather than the executive branch. As I argued in my column last week, the history of attempts by Congress to take a leadership role in directing warfare in our country is not encouraging.

In December of 1776, at the low-point of the Revolution, during the “times that try men’s souls,” the Continental Congress voted to deny itself war-making powers and gave those powers to Gen. Washington. At the Constitutional Convention, there was little debate about giving the powers of commander-in-chief to the president.

The Founders followed the advice of Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who, as historian David Hackett Fischer quotes, had argued that “The Fate of War is so uncertain, dependent on so many Contingencies. A Day, nay an Hour is so important in the Crisis of publick Affairs that it would be folly to wait for Relief from the deliberative Councils of Legislative Bodies.” Although Congress retained oversight and the power of the budget, the Founders recognized that Congressional committees were not the optimal directors of military policy.

But now we have this congressional-sponsored commission coming up with its own results developed without suitable research on the ground and without much military expertise. As Cohen says,

A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability" -- a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty."

No kidding -- but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge.

Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences?

War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action.

The commissions seems to have just decided how they would like Iran and Syria to behave in their fantasy world: not aid the insurgents in Iraq, stay out of Lebanon, not develop Iranian nuclear weapons, not attack Israel, the whole shebang of dream-world wishes about how some alternate universe Iranians and Syrians might want to behave. This is no way to win a war

posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 6:59 AM 0 comments

Comments: Post a Comment

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Thursday, December 07, 2006

How an advisory commision should have been conducted

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HOME Betsy neither necessarily uses, nor endorses, the products advertised on this site. The truth about Avesil Cheap Hosting Atlanta Bankruptcy Attorney Dallas Bankruptcy Attorney Wikio Get exclusive travel deals and book discount cheap flights Online Bachelors Degree Comments from an AP history and government teacher in Raleigh, NC. e-mail betsynewmark AT gmail.com Commissions earned from selling items through Amazon will go towards buying materials for my classes. Thank you. Site Feed		Thursday, December 07, 2006 How an advisory commision should have been conducted Eliot Cohen, who wrote a superb book on civilian leadership in wartime, Supreme Command, puts his finger on exactly what was wrong with the Iraq Study Group. The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war -- a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides. They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar. They -- not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries -- would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over. Instead we get this mess of pottage from the ISG. Perhaps that is the result when the direction from the group comes from the legislative rather than the executive branch. As I argued in my column last week, the history of attempts by Congress to take a leadership role in directing warfare in our country is not encouraging. In December of 1776, at the low-point of the Revolution, during the “times that try men’s souls,” the Continental Congress voted to deny itself war-making powers and gave those powers to Gen. Washington. At the Constitutional Convention, there was little debate about giving the powers of commander-in-chief to the president. The Founders followed the advice of Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who, as historian David Hackett Fischer quotes, had argued that “The Fate of War is so uncertain, dependent on so many Contingencies. A Day, nay an Hour is so important in the Crisis of publick Affairs that it would be folly to wait for Relief from the deliberative Councils of Legislative Bodies.” Although Congress retained oversight and the power of the budget, the Founders recognized that Congressional committees were not the optimal directors of military policy. But now we have this congressional-sponsored commission coming up with its own results developed without suitable research on the ground and without much military expertise. As Cohen says, A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability" -- a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty." No kidding -- but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge. Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences? War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action. The commissions seems to have just decided how they would like Iran and Syria to behave in their fantasy world: not aid the insurgents in Iraq, stay out of Lebanon, not develop Iranian nuclear weapons, not attack Israel, the whole shebang of dream-world wishes about how some alternate universe Iranians and Syrians might want to behave. This is no way to win a war posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 6:59 AM 0 comments Comments: Eliot Cohen, who wrote a superb book on civilian leadership in wartime, Supreme Command, puts his finger on exactly what was wrong with the Iraq Study Group. The theory of the thing is very peculiar indeed. You are in the middle of a war -- a hard war, a war that is going badly. If the government has bogged down, if the people inside have gone stale, you would say that the sound thing, the Churchillian or Lincolnian or Rooseveltian thing, would be, first, to fire a bunch of officials (generals as well as top civilians), promote or bring in fresh talent, and put together a small group of people to take a new and unillusioned look. Those people would report back in secrecy to the president and his most senior advisers and aides. They would consist of experienced soldiers and civilians in whom the president (who, after all, has to make the strategic decisions, and is the accountable executive) has trust. There would not be many of them, a half dozen or so, and they would have to be hardy enough to visit the war zone for several weeks, talking not just to politicians and generals but to captains and sergeants. They would go see things for themselves. They would visit a forward operating base near Tikrit; they would spend some time with Iraqi soldiers in Taji; they would take their chances in a convoy to al Asad, or even a patrol in Tal Afar. They -- not their staff of a few soldiers and secretaries -- would do the probing, digging, thinking, discussing and, above all, the writing. The chairman of the group would insist that they air their disagreements candidly and thoroughly in front of the president, engaging in a debate that might last a day, perhaps longer. The rest of us would not find out about the panel until months, or even years, after it reported back; maybe not until the war was over. Instead we get this mess of pottage from the ISG. Perhaps that is the result when the direction from the group comes from the legislative rather than the executive branch. As I argued in my column last week, the history of attempts by Congress to take a leadership role in directing warfare in our country is not encouraging. In December of 1776, at the low-point of the Revolution, during the “times that try men’s souls,” the Continental Congress voted to deny itself war-making powers and gave those powers to Gen. Washington. At the Constitutional Convention, there was little debate about giving the powers of commander-in-chief to the president. The Founders followed the advice of Gen. Nathaniel Greene, who, as historian David Hackett Fischer quotes, had argued that “The Fate of War is so uncertain, dependent on so many Contingencies. A Day, nay an Hour is so important in the Crisis of publick Affairs that it would be folly to wait for Relief from the deliberative Councils of Legislative Bodies.” Although Congress retained oversight and the power of the budget, the Founders recognized that Congressional committees were not the optimal directors of military policy. But now we have this congressional-sponsored commission coming up with its own results developed without suitable research on the ground and without much military expertise. As Cohen says, A fatuous process yields, necessarily, fatuous results. "Iraq's neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability" -- a statement only somewhat ameliorated by the admission that some are even "undercutting stability," which sounds as though Syria and Iran were being downright rude, rather than providing indispensable assistance to those who have filled the burn wards of Walter Reed, the morgue in Baghdad, and the cemetery at Arlington. The selected remedy is, first and foremost, rather like the ISG's credo for its own functioning, consensus. "The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region," as if our chief failure with Bashar Assad or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad lies with the hitherto unnoticed laziness or rhetorical ineptitude of our diplomats, or as though Europe, Saudi Arabia and Israel have not yet figured out that stability in Iraq is a good thing. "Syria should control its border" and "Iran should respect Iraq's sovereignty." No kidding -- but who is going to make them? That perennial solution, "resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict," makes its appearance, including direct negotiations between Israel and Palestinians, but only with "those who accept Israel's right to exist." The report conveniently forgets that the elected leaders of Palestine do not, in fact, accept Israel's right to exist. And it also neglects the grim reality that one of the most terrible things about Gaza, and possibly the West Bank as well, is that no one, not even Hamas, is really in charge. Part of Iran's price for easing up on us in Iraq is pretty clearly taking the heat off its nuclear program; the ISG recommends that that issue "should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany." Well, what deal should the U.S. be willing to cut on Iranian nuclear weapons? Do we think the Iranians would deliver? And what are the long-term consequences? War, and warlike statecraft, is a hard business, and though this is supposed to be a report dominated by "realists," there is nothing realistic in failing to spell out the bloody deeds, grim probabilities and dismal consequences associated with even the best course of action. The commissions seems to have just decided how they would like Iran and Syria to behave in their fantasy world: not aid the insurgents in Iraq, stay out of Lebanon, not develop Iranian nuclear weapons, not attack Israel, the whole shebang of dream-world wishes about how some alternate universe Iranians and Syrians might want to behave. This is no way to win a war posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 6:59 AM 0 comments Comments: Post a Comment