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Thursday, June 08, 2006

Al Qaeda Leaders Are Going to be Even More Depressed

Two months ago we captured documents in Iraq from an Al Qaeda leader bemoaning how difficult things had gotten for them in Iraq. The author acknowledged that Al Qaeda could do no more than be a "daily annoyance."
It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government.
The author fretted about the difficulties Al Qaeda had in organizing and leading attacks in Iraq.
There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations
Well, that leadership is going to be in a tougher place now. When they realize that someone they know rolled over on Zarqawi, they're going to all start suspecting each other and have a harder time organizing themselves. And other Iraqis are going to be more willing to turn in the insurgents as they gain more confidence in the Iraq government.

The one really strong weapon that Al Qaeda has in Iraq is the ability to kill a bunch of civilians and then use the media to spread terror. In other words, they are using the media as one of their weapons of terror.
The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction.
Of course, we haven't seen much talk on the media analyzing their own role as a strategic part of Al Qaeda's terror policy. The media loves to have navel-gazing symposia all the time about how they're doing their job, and love talking about how dangerous it is for the journalists reporting in Iraq, which it certainly is, but little discussion of how the terrorists have been killing people especially to get media coverage.

Captain Ed had an extensive analysis of this captured Al Qaeda document a month ago and had a lot more , but I thought the self-acknowledged weakness of Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to be revisited in light of Zarqawi's death. You'll see a lot of people on the media and politicians talking today about how this doesn't mean the end of the terror in Iraq, and that is true. But it is one more sign of how weakened they are.

posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 7:04 AM 0 comments

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Two months ago we captured documents in Iraq from an Al Qaeda leader bemoaning how difficult things had gotten for them in Iraq. The author acknowledged that Al Qaeda could do no more than be a "daily annoyance."

It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government.

The author fretted about the difficulties Al Qaeda had in organizing and leading attacks in Iraq.

There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations

Well, that leadership is going to be in a tougher place now. When they realize that someone they know rolled over on Zarqawi, they're going to all start suspecting each other and have a harder time organizing themselves. And other Iraqis are going to be more willing to turn in the insurgents as they gain more confidence in the Iraq government.

The one really strong weapon that Al Qaeda has in Iraq is the ability to kill a bunch of civilians and then use the media to spread terror. In other words, they are using the media as one of their weapons of terror.

The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction.

Of course, we haven't seen much talk on the media analyzing their own role as a strategic part of Al Qaeda's terror policy. The media loves to have navel-gazing symposia all the time about how they're doing their job, and love talking about how dangerous it is for the journalists reporting in Iraq, which it certainly is, but little discussion of how the terrorists have been killing people especially to get media coverage.

Captain Ed had an extensive analysis of this captured Al Qaeda document a month ago and had a lot more , but I thought the self-acknowledged weakness of Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to be revisited in light of Zarqawi's death. You'll see a lot of people on the media and politicians talking today about how this doesn't mean the end of the terror in Iraq, and that is true. But it is one more sign of how weakened they are.

posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 7:04 AM 0 comments

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Thursday, June 08, 2006

Al Qaeda Leaders Are Going to be Even More Depressed

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HOME Betsy neither necessarily uses, nor endorses, the products advertised on this site. The truth about Avesil Cheap Hosting Atlanta Bankruptcy Attorney Dallas Bankruptcy Attorney Wikio Get exclusive travel deals and book discount cheap flights Online Bachelors Degree Comments from an AP history and government teacher in Raleigh, NC. e-mail betsynewmark AT gmail.com Commissions earned from selling items through Amazon will go towards buying materials for my classes. Thank you. Site Feed		Thursday, June 08, 2006 Al Qaeda Leaders Are Going to be Even More Depressed Two months ago we captured documents in Iraq from an Al Qaeda leader bemoaning how difficult things had gotten for them in Iraq. The author acknowledged that Al Qaeda could do no more than be a "daily annoyance." It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. The author fretted about the difficulties Al Qaeda had in organizing and leading attacks in Iraq. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations Well, that leadership is going to be in a tougher place now. When they realize that someone they know rolled over on Zarqawi, they're going to all start suspecting each other and have a harder time organizing themselves. And other Iraqis are going to be more willing to turn in the insurgents as they gain more confidence in the Iraq government. The one really strong weapon that Al Qaeda has in Iraq is the ability to kill a bunch of civilians and then use the media to spread terror. In other words, they are using the media as one of their weapons of terror. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction. Of course, we haven't seen much talk on the media analyzing their own role as a strategic part of Al Qaeda's terror policy. The media loves to have navel-gazing symposia all the time about how they're doing their job, and love talking about how dangerous it is for the journalists reporting in Iraq, which it certainly is, but little discussion of how the terrorists have been killing people especially to get media coverage. Captain Ed had an extensive analysis of this captured Al Qaeda document a month ago and had a lot more , but I thought the self-acknowledged weakness of Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to be revisited in light of Zarqawi's death. You'll see a lot of people on the media and politicians talking today about how this doesn't mean the end of the terror in Iraq, and that is true. But it is one more sign of how weakened they are. posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 7:04 AM 0 comments Comments: Two months ago we captured documents in Iraq from an Al Qaeda leader bemoaning how difficult things had gotten for them in Iraq. The author acknowledged that Al Qaeda could do no more than be a "daily annoyance." It has been proven that the Shiites have a power and influence in Baghdad that cannot be taken lightly, particularly when the power of the Ministries of Interior and Defense is given to them, compared with the power of the mujahidin in Baghdad. During a military confrontation, they will be in a better position because they represent the power of the state along with the power of the popular militias. Most of the mujahidin power lies in surprise attacks (hit and run) or setting up explosive charges and booby traps. This is a different matter than a battle with organized forces that possess machinery and suitable communications networks. Thus, what is fixed in the minds of the Shiite and Sunni population is that the Shiites are stronger in Baghdad and closer to controlling it while the mujahidin (who represent the backbone of the Sunni people) are not considered more than a daily annoyance to the Shiite government. The author fretted about the difficulties Al Qaeda had in organizing and leading attacks in Iraq. There is a clear absence of organization among the groups of the brothers in Baghdad, whether at the leadership level in Baghdad, the brigade leaders, or their groups therein. Coordination among them is very difficult, which appears clearly when the group undertake a join operations Well, that leadership is going to be in a tougher place now. When they realize that someone they know rolled over on Zarqawi, they're going to all start suspecting each other and have a harder time organizing themselves. And other Iraqis are going to be more willing to turn in the insurgents as they gain more confidence in the Iraq government. The one really strong weapon that Al Qaeda has in Iraq is the ability to kill a bunch of civilians and then use the media to spread terror. In other words, they are using the media as one of their weapons of terror. The policy followed by the brothers in Baghdad is a media oriented policy without a clear comprehensive plan to capture an area or an enemy center. Other word, the significance of the strategy of their work is to show in the media that the American and the government do not control the situation and there is resistance against them. This policy dragged us to the type of operations that are attracted to the media, and we go to the streets from time to time for more possible noisy operations which follow the same direction. Of course, we haven't seen much talk on the media analyzing their own role as a strategic part of Al Qaeda's terror policy. The media loves to have navel-gazing symposia all the time about how they're doing their job, and love talking about how dangerous it is for the journalists reporting in Iraq, which it certainly is, but little discussion of how the terrorists have been killing people especially to get media coverage. Captain Ed had an extensive analysis of this captured Al Qaeda document a month ago and had a lot more , but I thought the self-acknowledged weakness of Al Qaeda in Iraq needed to be revisited in light of Zarqawi's death. You'll see a lot of people on the media and politicians talking today about how this doesn't mean the end of the terror in Iraq, and that is true. But it is one more sign of how weakened they are. posted by Betsy Newmark permalink 7:04 AM 0 comments Comments: Post a Comment